Do Fines for Gambling Operators Really Change the Market?
Regulators impose fines on gambling operators to enforce compliance and responsible business practices. However, given the scale of these companies, do fines serve as real deterrents or merely minor operational costs? Take Unibet, for example – its regulatory issues in France, the Netherlands, and Australia, along with its history of operating in unlicensed markets, suggest that financial penalties may not be enough.
€800,000 Fine for Self-Exclusion Failures
Between March 2021 and December 2022, a system malfunction let thousands of self-excluded players continue gambling, undermining responsible gaming efforts.
€400,000 Fine for Violating the Cruks Self-Exclusion System
In December 2024, the Dutch gambling regulator, Kansspelautoriteit (KSA), imposed a €400,000 fine on Unibet for breaching self-exclusion regulations.
During the 2022 FIFA World Cup, Unibet allowed 15 self-excluded players to register and gamble between November 22, 2022, and January 30, 2023.
The violation occurred when Unibet, facing increased traffic, modified its standard registration process, enabling sign-ups without verifying the Dutch citizen service number (BSN).
KSA emphasized that strict compliance with the Centraal Register Uitsluiting Kansspelen (Cruks) is essential for responsible gambling, and any failure to adhere to these regulations results in significant penalties.
$60,000 Fine for Illegal Advertising
In 2023, Unibet’s Australian subsidiary, Betchoice, was fined AU$60,000 (~€38,000) for breaching advertising laws in New South Wales (NSW).
The company promoted price push offers—enhanced odds classified as illegal gambling inducements.
NSW law forbids operators from enticing people to bet, yet Unibet had already faced a AU$48,000 fine in 2021 for similar violations.
Despite repeated offenses, these fines remain insignificant compared to Unibet’s Australian revenues. The unethical actions of this operator do not stop there, though.
Lawsuits Over Pre-Legalization Losses
While some lawsuits succeeded, Unibet now makes it harder for players to retrieve gambling records that could support claims.
utch authorities continue scrutinizing the company, and politicians have even called for a review of its license due to past violations.
Unibet’s History of Operating Without a License
Unibet presents itself as a reputable global brand but has repeatedly operated in unregulated or illegal markets.
Before leaving Poland in 2024, it served Polish players without a local license, violating gambling laws.
The aforementioned Netherlands had a similar case. Unibet accepted players before securing a Dutch license in 2021, leading to lawsuits and financial penalties.
The company also operated in other restricted markets, often paying minor fines while continuing business as usual.
In 2024, France’s national lottery operator, FDJ (Française des Jeux), acquired Kindred Group, Unibet’s parent company, as part of its expansion into the sports betting sector. Shortly after the acquisition, Unibet withdrew from Poland.
For a brand of this size, deliberately operating illegally while treating fines as minor expenses raises ethical concerns.
These penalties fail to stop major operators from questionable practices because profits outweigh the risks.
Do These Fines Serve as a Real Deterrent?
Fines vary widely across different countries. France imposed a €800,000 penalty, while Australia’s fine was only AU$60,000 (~€38,000). Even the larger amounts, however, remain insignificant next to industry revenues.
Now part of FDJ, Unibet continues to dominate the gambling sector. FDJ reported €2.6 billion in revenue for 2023, while Unibet’s previous owner, Kindred Group, earned over €1.5 billion.
FDJ reported revenue of €3.07 billion in 2024. This represents a year-on-year increase of 17%. This was driven in part by the acquisition of Kindred. As of October 11, Kindred’s financial contribution was included in FDJ’s results.
FDJ’s growth was also supported by a 21% increase in adjusted EBITDA, which reached 792 million euros, with an EBITDA margin of 25.8%. Even without Kindred, the company posted 10% revenue growth.
In this context, an €800,000 fine represents just 0.026% of FDJ’s annual revenue and approximately 0.053% of Unibet’s former parent company, Kindred’s revenue—a negligible sum with virtually no financial impact. If penalties don’t threaten profits, their effectiveness as deterrents remains questionable.
Unibet’s Circumvention of Gambling Restrictions in Belgium
Fines aren’t the only tool regulators use to control the gambling industry. Some companies find creative ways to bypass restrictions.
In Belgium, new gambling sponsorship laws came into effect on January 1, 2025, prohibiting sports clubs from promoting gambling brands on team shirts and limiting gambling logos in stadiums. While clubs can still feature gambling logos on the back of shirts, they cannot exceed 75 cm² in size.
Instead of dropping Unibet, Club Brugge allegedly enlarged the sponsor’s logo to maximize visibility while still technically complying with the size limitations.
Anderlecht faced similar accusations regarding its sponsor, Napoleon Sports. Both clubs denied wrongdoing, claiming they followed the regulations.
This case highlights how clubs and sponsors manipulate sponsorship rules to maintain gambling visibility.
Some clubs even altered gambling company names on jerseys to appear unrelated while still linking to betting platforms.
Despite regulatory efforts, these tactics show that penalties and restrictions have little effect, as operators and their partners continue to find ways to work around them.
This further reinforces the idea that fines are merely an operational cost for companies like Unibet rather than a true deterrent.
Are Fines Enough?
Unibet’s repeated fines and regulatory issues show that financial penalties alone don’t ensure compliance.
Regulators use them to send a message, but major operators continue questionable practices because the financial consequences remain minimal.
FDJ’s acquisition of Unibet and its exit from Poland suggest that strategic business decisions, not fines, drive compliance.
As long as fines stay small relative to revenue, operators will likely see them as minor inconveniences rather than serious deterrents.
If regulators want to enforce real consequences, they must impose fines proportional to revenue and consider stricter measures like license revocations.
Otherwise, the industry will continue viewing financial penalties as just another cost of doing business.