Poland vs. Finland: A Debate on Online Gambling Regulations

Bartosz Burzyński (journalist):

What do you currently see as the biggest legal challenge or uncertainty for operators looking to enter your market?

Antti Koivula (legal adviser at Legal Gaming Attorneys at Law):

Arguably the greatest legal challenge for operators considering entry into the Finnish market is currently the significant level of remaining regulatory uncertainty and the pressure to make decisions on market entry before a fully finalized regulatory framework. The new Gambling Act, which will introduce a multi-licensing system, is currently under parliamentary review and is anticipated to be approved next Autumn.

The first draft of the technical regulations has been published recently, but the final versions will be ready only towards the end of 2025. Although major revisions are not expected, the draft is still subject to change. Adding to the regulatory uncertainty, the legislation grants authorities the power to issue secondary legislation and binding guidelines on various key matters, which they may only use after the Gambling Act has passed the Parliament — further contributing to the prevailing ambiguity.

For example, it remains unclear what the maximum stake for online casino games will be, what will be considered an acceptable round speed, whether autoplay will be permitted, and whether certain game features such as bonus buys will be allowed. Furthermore, while the proposed law will allow offering moderate bonuses to existing customers, there is currently no definition of what constitutes “moderate,” nor is it clear how long a customer must be registered before being eligible to receive such bonuses. There would be plenty of other examples too.

With the licensing process set to begin on January 1, 2026 — and operators expected to start preparations well in advance — there is a strong likelihood that key strategic decisions regarding market entry will need to be made without the benefit of a fully finalized regulatory framework, particularly for those aiming to be among the first to obtain a licence. While not an ideal scenario, it is not without precedent and has been encountered in other jurisdictions to a certain extent.

Marek Plota (attorney-at-law, Gaming in Poland CEO):

In Poland, the greatest legal challenges for operators are less about regulatory ambiguity and more about two specific systemic obstacles which, while clearly defined, present significant entry barriers.

The first major issue is the tax model. Sports betting is subject to a 12% turnover tax, not GGR-based taxation. This significantly reduces margins and is often cited as the single biggest reason why many international operators have opted not to pursue a Polish licence. Despite this, the legal sports betting market has shown remarkable resilience and growth, expanding on average by 25% year over year, with channelization reaching 75%. In 2024 alone, the sector generated a GGR of EUR 567 million with total turnover of approximately EUR 3.5 billion. These figures speak to the sheer potential of the market, even under suboptimal conditions.

The second major challenge is the state monopoly on online casino games. Private operators are entirely excluded from this vertical, which is reserved for the state-owned entity, Totalizator Sportowy. While the monopoly has made meaningful progress in terms of customer acquisition and brand awareness, channelization in the online casino segment remains at around 60%, clearly leaving room for improvement. That’s why the industry is actively working to convince the regulator to consider intermediate solutions, such as sublicensing models for already-licensed betting operators, rather than full liberalisation at this stage. The idea is to maintain state control while allowing responsible, licensed private operators to contribute to better channelization outcomes.

To summarise, while the turnover tax and lack of access to the casino vertical are the two core constraints, the Polish sports betting market continues to grow dynamically and shows no signs of slowing. Considering Poland’s population of 38 million, the long‑term potential of this market is simply too significant to ignore for any operator with European ambitions.

Finland is currently Europe’s most closely observed example of a regulatory system in transition and we are observing your regulatory reform process with both interest and a touch of envy. The prospect of opening the market, especially the casino vertical, offers valuable lessons for markets like ours. At the same time, we’re also following some of the analytical projections with great curiosity. Some commentators have suggested that legalising online casinos outside the monopoly structure might paradoxically increase gambling-related harm, since the previous outright prohibition may have acted as a limiting factor.

From your perspective, do you think these analysts have a point? Or would you say the current levels of problem gambling are underestimated, precisely because the unlicensed/grey sector operates outside the view of institutions tasked with monitoring gambling harm?

Antti Koivula:

The concept of a turnover tax has always struck me as quite extreme — but you mentioned that, despite this, Poland has achieved a 75% channelization rate in sports betting, alongside a remarkable 25% year‑over‑year GGR growth. Considering Poland’s population, GDP per capita, and strong cultural enthusiasm for sports, it’s not hard to believe there’s still room for further growth beyond the current level of EUR 567 million.

Given how the Polish market has evolved, perhaps the turnover tax model isn’t as unreasonable as it initially seems? To achieve such impressive figures, I assume several conditions must be met: a pragmatic marketing regulation framework, a genuinely cooperative regulator, and an effective approach to black market enforcement. For example, I would assume there are no affiliate or streamer bans, no prohibitions on welcome bonuses, and no restrictions on the use of online tracking tools — as are currently being proposed for Finland’s new regulation?

On the topic of enforcement, I’d be curious to know what legal instruments the Polish regulator has at its disposal to combat the black market. More importantly, what kind of enforcement approach have they adopted? This is especially relevant from the Finnish perspective, as I’m genuinely concerned that the proposed legislation here fails to equip the regulator with sufficiently robust tools. The primary instruments — prohibition orders, administrative fines, and takedown requests — are inherently difficult to enforce across jurisdictions, which will likely limit their practical impact. Additionally, given the current regulator’s track record, there is a genuine concern that their approach to tackling the black market may remain overly lenient under the new system as well.

You also noted that online casino games in Poland, which remain under a state monopoly, have achieved around 60% channelization. That’s below the 75% seen in betting, but is it really such a poor result? For comparison, estimates suggest the corresponding figure in Finland is currently around 25%, give or take. The situation in online fixed odds betting is even more concerning, with some estimates as low as 10%.

And this, ultimately, is what prompted the ongoing reform in Finland: the competitive licensing model is being introduced only for those verticals where the monopoly has failed — namely, betting, online casino, online slots and online bingo. Meanwhile, verticals where the monopoly has maintained neartotal market share (lottery games, scratch cards, physical slot machines, and physical casino games) will remain under the exclusive rights model. As some MPs have openly stated over the years: “Don’t kill the cash cow” It may not be fair in principle, but it is certainly understandable from a fiscal policy perspective.

You also referenced some commentators who argue that allowing online casino games outside the monopoly structure could increase gamblingrelated harm. I’ve heard these arguments too, though according to the studies cited to me by the same people, the system choice is irrelevant, and all that matters from a harmreduction perspective are the details within the system. But here’s the critical point: gambling harm in Finland is already at an alltime high under the monopoly system. The problem gambling rate rose from 3.0% in 2019 to 4.2% in 2023, according to the Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare. Strikingly, these arguments often omit a proper point of comparison and include a lot of cherrypicking. Whether or not online casino games generate more harm under a competitive model is beside the point — because the status quo is clearly failing and it should be the point of comparison, rather than some theoretical construction.

Moreover, there are legitimate questions about the monopoly operator’s priorities. For example, it was last year imposed a recordhigh EUR 2.9 million conditional fine for targeting gambling ads at minors during Saturday afternoon cartoons. More recently, it raised the annual loss limit from EUR 15,000 to EUR 24,000. This is just the tip of the iceberg, which does not signal a particularly strong commitment to harm reduction and responsible gambling. Meanwhile, foreign operators — who now control over 50% of the whole Finnish online market, and an even larger share in online casino and online fixed odds betting — are under no obligation to comply with Finnish RG standards.

From that perspective, implementing a licensing model that extends uniform RG rules to all operators, combined with proper regulatory oversight (at least over the licensed operators), might actually be a better alternative for the status quo. Wouldn’t you agree?

Marek Plota:

You’ve raised several important points, and I’ll try to address each in turn.

I’ve never been a fan of taxing gross turnover, especially as the 12% rate applied in Poland remains the highest in Europe. While local operators have adapted, in practice only the top three or four brands consistently achieve profitability. The structure favors large, well financed entities with strong marketing capacity and long term strategy. It limits competition and market access for smaller players. That’s why we continue to advocate for a shift to a GGR based model, which we believe would stimulate healthy competition, innovation, and better outcomes for consumers.

You’re also correct in assuming that advertising regulation in Poland is relatively permissive, though not without complexity. The distinction between “advertising” (permitted) and “promotion” (prohibited beyond the operator’s own site) is legally vague and can be a minefield. Still, online marketing, affiliate partnerships, and the use of bonuses and free bets are widely used. This flexibility, combined with market experience, has helped licensed operators grow their share and contributed to a relatively high channelization rate.

The online casino sector presents a different picture. The state monopoly, Totalizator Sportowy, has invested heavily in product development, but operates under a complete ban on advertising and promotion. This significantly limits its ability to attract and retain customers. As a result, grey and black market operators remain strong. In this context, the main tools for enforcement are non commercial: the national blacklist of banned domains, now covering nearly 50,000 entries, and complementary efforts in public education and awareness.

While imperfect, the blacklist — combined with growing efforts to disrupt payment services supporting illegal operators — has yielded some success. Over the past 12 months, I’ve participated in several industry and parliamentary consultations aimed at strengthening these tools. Yet we must acknowledge their limitations. Poland lacks practical legal instruments to pursue foreign entities acting unlawfully. This is precisely why the industry has proposed a sublicensing framework, allowing vetted, licensed betting operators to distribute regulated casino products under strict conditions. It’s a pragmatic path towards better consumer protection and reduced grey market activity, without requiring a full market liberalization.

Your figures about Finland’s channelization are striking, and seem even lower than widely cited estimates. It confirms the fundamental challenge of monopoly driven models: without effective enforcement or marketing tools, channelization inevitably suffers. I also noted that the Finnish National Police Board currently lists only one blocked entity, suggesting significant room for expanding enforcement measures like site blocking, which have proven at least partially effective in Poland.

In my view, the best regulatory outcomes arise from a balance of three elements: a competitive and sustainable tax structure, a balanced and clear advertising regime, and enforceable tools for combating the grey market. Without this equilibrium, the legal market will struggle to flourish, and the unlicensed one will continue to dominate.